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Attorney for. Respondents, 
521 E. Ninth South Street, 
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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JACQUELINE HARDMAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
DoNALD MATTHEWS and C. J. 
MATTHEWS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 7980 
ANSWER TO INTERMEDIATE APPEAL FROM 
ORDER GRANTING THIRD-PARTY ACTION, 
AND BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree with the statement of facts 
contained in appellant's brief in support of her ap-
peal from order granting third-party action hereto-
fore entered by the Honorable Clarence E. Baker on 
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the 13th day of January, 1953, granting the third-
party action and denying appellant's motion to re-
consider its order granting the third-party action to 
defendants and therefore refrains from further re-
hearsal of it, except to invite the Court's atten-
tion to the prayer of the Third-Party Complaint 
wherein respondents (Third-Party Plaintiffs) demand 
judgment against the Third-Party Defendants, in part, 
as follows: 
( 1) .... and for such sums as may be 
adjudged in this action against Defendants and 
Third-Party Plaintiffs in favor of the plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE LOWER COURT GRANTED RE-
SPONDENTS' MOTION TO ALLOW 
WILLIAM A. JOHNSON AND MARI-
LYN MILLER JOHHSON TO BE 
BROUGHT IN AS THIRD-PARTY DE-
FENDANTS IN THIS ACTION IN 
CONFORMITY WITH THE PROVI-
SIONS OF UTAH RULE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 14 (a). 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. THE LOWER COURT GRANT-
ED RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO ALLOW 
WILLIAM A. JOHNSON AND MARILYN MIL-
LER JOHNSON TO BE BROUGHT IN AS 
THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS IN THIS AC-
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TION IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PROVI-
SIONS OF UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 14(a). 
Rule 1 (a) U tab Rules of Civil Procedure, by its 
last sentence, explicitly provides that "they (the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure) shall be liberally construed 
to secure the just, needy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action.'' 
The decisions are in harmony that the purpose 
of the rule is to avoid circuity of action and to ad-
just in a single suit, several phases of the same con-
troversy as it affects the parties. Bossard et ux vs. 
McGwinn et al., D. C., 27 Fed. Supp. 42; Kravos 
et al. vs. Great Atlantic ~ Pacific Tea Co., D. C., 
28 Fed. Supp. 66; Sklor et ux vs. Hayes, D. C. 1 F. 
R. D. (Federal Rules Decisions) 415; Sussan vs. 
Strasser et al., D. C., 36 Fed. Supp. 266; Arsht vs. 
Hatton, 72 Fed. Supp. 851. 
Granting of motion to implead a third party is 
a matter of judicial discretion, (decided Jan. 16, 
1953), United States vs. DeHaven, 13 Federal Rules 
Decisions 435. Appellant, on page 7 of her brief, 
charges that respondents are attempting to "force" 
plaintiff to litigate her claim against the third-party 
defendants ... on the grounds that these parties were 
negligent and therefore liable for plaintiffs injuries; 
whereas, respondents' ""force," if such it be, is not 
force directed toward appellant, but is force, if it be 
such, directed toward the third-party defendants and 
for judgment against them "for such sums as may be 
adjudged in this action against defendants and third-
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4 
party plaintiffs in favor of plaintiff. Appellant may 
not wish to litigate her claim against the third-party 
defendants, but respondents choose to litigate their 
claim with the third-party defendants and obtain judg-
ment against them as prayed. Therefore, appellant 
is somewhat confused as against whom the so-called 
force is aimed and her conception of the situation is 
slightly in error. And, appellant's charge on the 
same page 7 of her brief that the so-called "force" is 
attempted to be used by showing that negligence of 
the third-party defendants caused them to be liable 
for plaintiffs injuries, but fail to charge against whom 
such liability is directed. There is no charge on the 
part of the appellant that such liability creates lia-
bility to plaintiffs benefit, unless she chooses to amend 
her complaint so as to state a cause of action against 
the third-party defendants. The liability which re-
spondents have attempted to set forth is one which 
would inure to the benefit of respondents in the event 
plaintiff secured a judgment against them. Appel-
lant's argument, in this respect, is not sound. 
Page 8 of appellant's brief asserts that defend-
ants (respondents) cannot comply with that portion 
of rule 14 (a) "that the third-party defendants may 
be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim 
against him." And why cannot respondents com-
ply with such provision of Rule 14(a)? Why, that 
is the very thing respondents have undertaken to do 
when they alleged in the third-party complaint a set 
of facts which were of such a nature as to permit re-
spondents to recoup by contribution, indemnity, lia-
bility over, or otherwise, from the third-party de-
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fendants "such sums as may be adjudged in this ac-
tion against Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiff in 
favor of the plaintiff.'• Culmer vs. Wilson, 13 Ut. 
129, 44 Pac. 833; Contribution Between Persons 
Jointly Charged For Negligence. 12 Harvard Law Re-
view 176. 
And, "Based upon such reasoning," as expressed 
by appellant on page 10 of her brief, wherein it is 
stated "and, if the plaintiff rejects it, the allowing 
of the third parties to be made defendants is useless 
gesture," where appellant's "reasoning" is based upon 
assumption of facts not alleged in the third-party 
complaint, there is no useless gesture to be found. It 
will not stand as good "reasoning" when respondents 
demand judgment against the third-party defendants 
for such sums as may be adjudged against defendants 
and third-party plaintiffs in favor of the plaintiff. 
Two requisites are found in the provisions of 
said Rule 14 (e) which qualify a person to become a 
third-party deendant, to-wit: That he is not a party 
to the action and, that he is or may be liable to the 
defendant (third-party plaintiff) for all or part of 
the plaintiff's claim against him. It is quite clear 
that the third-party defendants were not parties to 
the action originally, and therefore, they qualify in that 
respect. Our principal argument, of necessity, then 
will be directed to the question whether these third-
party defendants "or may be liable to defendants for 
all or part of plaintiff's claim against them.'' 
Perhaps, appellant may argue that there is no 
specific allegation by respondents that the persons 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
named as Third-Party Defendants are "or may be 
liable to them for all or part of plaintiffs claim 
against them." If so, bear in mind that said Rule 
14 (a) requires such liability as a qualification to be-
coming a Third-Party defendant, and that respondents 
pursued the procedure outlined in Rule 14 (a) to 
bring in Third-Party defendants who are "or may be 
liable to them for all or part of plaintiff's claim against 
them." That respondents, the appellant and the lower 
Court proceeded to act under Rule 14 (a), that the 
prayer of the "Third-Party Complaint" demanded 
judgment, among other things, against the third-
party defendants "for such sums as may be adjudged 
in this action against Defendants and Third-Party 
Plaintiffs, in favor of the plaintiff;" all of which fac-
tors combined left no doubt in the mind of 1anyone 
concerned that respondents required the third-party 
defendants be made parties to the action so as to avoid 
circuty of action and "to adjust in a single suit, the 
several phases of the same controversy as it effects 
the parties." Respondents' said prayer for judgment 
against the Third-Party Defendants "for such sums 
as may be adjudged ... against third-party plaintiffs 
(respondents), in favor of the plaintiff" (appellant 
herein), disclosed the fact that respondents claimed 
the third-party defendants are "or may be liable to 
them for all or part of plaintiff's (Appellant's) claim 
against them." No other conception of such demand 
for judgment would be logical, sound or correct. The 
showing by said demand for judgment against the 
Third-Party Defendants "for such sums as may 
be adjudged against Defendants and Third-Party 
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ficient in and of itself to demonstrate that no 
other inference can be drawn therefrom than respond-
ents' claim that the Third-Party Defendants are or 
may be liable for all or part of plaintiff's claim against 
them, and should settle such question beyond equivo-
cation. If this Court were to hold that respondents' 
Third-Party Complaint is insufficient because of fail-
ure to set forth therein such claim of liability to re-
spondents for all or part of appellant's claim against 
respondents, such omission could be cured by amend-
ment of the Third-Party complaint, which amend-
ment the respondents would undertake to have made. 
However, respondents contend that the intendment 
and inferences are sufficiently shown in the said Third-
Party Complaint to comply with said Rule 14(a) 
that it does not take much imagination to determine 
that was respondents' purpose and such purpose was 
to comply with the requirements of said Rule 14 (a) 
and to meet the very situation now confronting us. 
It makes little difference whether appellant 
amends her complaint to state a cause of action against 
the Third-Party Defendants. If she does not so 
amend her complaint in that particular, it becomes 
quite obvious that she would be entitled to no judg-
ment against the Third-Party Defendants. The lib-
eral construction of the Third-Party Procedure was 
devised to determine in one action the several phases 
of the same controversy as it affects the parties, and 
should not permit appellant's failure so to amend her 
complaint to prevent determination of the same con-
troversy as it affects the respondents and the Third-
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Party Defendants. Further, appellant's option so 
to amend her complaint, or her refusal so to do, alone 
does not govern the determination of the application 
of Rule 14 (a) . A voidance of circuity of action and 
the adjustment of the controversy as it affects the 
parties governs and controls such application and per-
mits respondents to litigate with Third-Party De-
fendants, in this action, the alleged liability of the 
Third-Party Defendants to respondents which now 
exists or which may exist for all or part of appellant's 
claim against respondents. 
Therefore, in the event respondents, by judg-
ment, were held liable to appellant for some amount 
for which respondents contend, as respondents do 
contend in this action, that the negligence of the third-
party defendants was the proximate cause of appel-
lant's damage, then the third-party defendants are or 
may be liable to respondents for all or part of appel-
lant's claim against respondents; and, respondents 
need not, by circuity of action, be compelled to main-
tain a separate action against the Third-Party Defend-
ants to enforce their demand against the Third-Party 
Defendants whose negligence may have been the prox-
imate cause of all the damage suffered by appellant 
and respondents. And, the liberal construction of said 
Rule 14 (a), as provided for in Rule 1, supra, mani-
festly was written and adopted to meet just such ob-
jections to the Third-Party procedure as now are 
adduced by appellant. 
The Federal Supreme Court, by amendment ef-
fective March 19, 1948, dropped the phrase authoriz-
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ing the impleader of persons liable to the plaintiff and 
changed the rule in other particulars mainly for pur-
poses of clarification. To summarize the foregoing 
change. it may be said that under Rule 14 as origi-
nally framed the defendant might have brought in as 
a third-party defendant either a person who was sec-
ondarily liable to him or a person who was primarily 
liable to plaintiff. Under the 1948 amendment only 
a person who is secondarily liable to the original de-
fendant may be brought in. I Federal Practice and 
Procedure Rules Edition. section 4 21. pages 8 3 5-8 57. 
In Yap vs Ferguson. 8 Federal Rules Decisions 
166. it is stated: 
''Third-Party Complaint further alleges that 
plaintiffs damages were caused by reason of the 
failure of third-party defendant to comply with 
all the terms and conditions of its contract of 
sale and the warranty thereunder. and that if any 
recovery be had against defendant. the third-party 
defendants are liable to it therefor. 
When the respective claims are the same and 
a recovery by the plaintiff against the defendant 
would necessarily be followed by a recovery for 
the defendant against the third-party defendant. 
then joinder is proper. Bancroft Bldg. Corpora-
tion vs. Eisner. 263 App. Div. 877. 32 N. Y. 
2d 166; Host vs. Minkowitz. Sup. 53 N.Y.S. 2d 
251. 
... Where there is a substantive right to in-
demnification or contribution accruing to defend-
ant against a third-party defendant. the procedure 
for its enforcement is to be found in Rule 14. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... 
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Respondents appreciate the fact that the Federal 
cases cited herein pertain to Rule 14 (a) before amend-
ment, and that, no doubt, any allegation of liability 
of Third-Party Defendants to plaintiff in third-party 
complaint subsequent to the amendment would be 
considered surplusage. Appellant, no doubt, has in 
mind cases like Statink vs. Holland Tp. et al., 28 Fed. 
Supp. 67, wherein defendants did not undertake to do 
more than tender to plaintiff other defendants who 
they said are liable solely to the plaintiff, and plaintiff 
indicated she will seek no recovery from the third-party 
defendants tendered by original defendants. But, that 
line of reasoning does not affect the instant case where 
respondents DO undertake to do more than make such 
tender, and do seek judgment, not against the plain-
tiff, but for judgment against the Third-Party De-
fendants ufor such sums as may be adjudged .... 
against Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs in fa-
vor of plaintiff." 
Considering the amendment to the Federal Rule 
and its application to allegation of "liability to plain-
tiff" as surplusage, as hereinbefore stated, it seems ap-
propriate to quote from the Court's decision in Sus-
san vs. Strasser et al., supra, as follows: 
uAs stated by Alexander Holtzoff, Special 
Assistant to the Attorney General of the United 
States, in his admirable work, New Federal Pro-
cedure and the courts: 
"Rule 14 of the new Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure makes third-party practice an inherent 
part of th~ Federal Civil Procedure. Its purpose 
IS to permit a defendant to bring in a third party 
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who is liable on the same claim or who is subject 
to liability arising out of the claim on which the 
suit is based ..... The scope of the third-party 
practice under the new rules is exceedingly broad. 
It may be invoked against a party who is liable 
to the defendant for all or part of plaintiffs claim, 
as, for instance, in a case in which the third party 
is liable for contribution, or indemnification or as 
an insurer of the defendant's liability .... " 
The case of Arsht vs. Hatton, 72 Fed. Supp. 851, 
while, because of the Federal amendment to its Rule 
14 (a), is not exactly in point, renders some light on 
the controversy which this Court now is called upon 
to determine; as is the case of Kravas vs. Great Atlan-
tic~ Pacific Tea Co., 28 Fed. Supp. 66, and the case of 
Crum vs. Appalachian Electric Power Co. et al., 2 9 
Fed. Supp. 90, and the case of Jeub vs. B jG Foods, 
Inc., 2 Federal Rules Decisions 23 8. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, respondents contend that the 
lower Court granted respondents' motion for third-
party action in conformity with the provisions of U tab 
Rule of Civil Procedure 14 (a) ; and suggests that, in 
the event this Court determines otherwise that re-
spondents be given opportunity to amend their third-
party complaint to the effect that the third-party de-
fendants are or may be liable to respondents for all or 
part of appellant's claim against respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
0. H. MATTHEWS, 
Attorney for Respondents. 
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